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This essay is an attempt to assess some of the social forces and strategies that the Left 
have looked upon to provide a transformative medium in Africa. In dealing with this broad 
issue, the discussion centres on the following areas:
-  Liberation Movements;
-  Labour;
i
-  Social Movements
-  The State.
The assessment looks critically at the shortcomings of these social forces, and concludes 




When thinking about the problem of the Left in Africa, one is tempted to recall Brecht’s 
sardonic comment in the midst of the Fascist crisis: "The only people who are still laughing 
are those who have not heard the news." Clearly the news is not good and the Gramscian 
motif of "pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will" looks like an increasingly 
necessary intellectual and eihotional place to be.
This evaluation takes place against an. economic and political crisis in Africa that has 
been analysed'on numerous occasions, and for purposes of this discussion can be 
summarised as follows: At an economic level the crisis is represented by a growing debt 
problem, worsening terms of trade, disarray in agricultural production; lack of sustained 
industrialisation, and a steadily worsening condition of the popular class. In the political 
arena the scene is characterised by undemocratic, dependent states, and an increasing 
statisation of politics: As Anyong-Nyongo has deftly summarised it:
The role of the state as the focal point for social cohesion and social 
engineering is particularly important in societies that have not had time 
to melt and merge into solid nations where the people have some 
historical and a certain collective memory which may help explain away 
certain conflicts and rationalise or justify political and mination. Weak 
and young states, lacking time-tested legal frameworks and political 
cultures for conflict regulation, are likely to be very brittle in attempts at 
conflict resolution.1
This essay is an attempt to assess some of the social forces and strategies that the Left 
have looked upon to provide a transformative medium in Africa. In dealing with this broad 





I shall also examine, within this context, the fundamental constraint to change, that the 
Left have in differing ways identified, namely imperialism.
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
The constraints on radical transformation and development in Africa have been 
compellingly persistent. In the midst of this long nightmare of underdevelopment, various 
alternative vehicles of transformation have been put forward, celebrated, and later 
criticised, The liberation movement and the theory of protracted struggle earned a 
deserved reputation as an important medium for radical change. The idea that a lengthy 
struggle could serve as a sustained educational process in which the legacy of racist,
1 Introduction to P. Anyang’ Nyongo’ (Ed.) -  Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa -  U.N.U, ZED Books, 1987,
P-17
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exploitative relations could be challenged in practice, and new forms of consciousness and 
culture developed as a prevision of an alternative hegemony, was an exciting, and in many 
ways, a fruitful, practical and theoretical challenge. Recently, however, Mandaza, amongst 
others, has challenged this view of protracted struggle as being a romanticised view qf 
radicalisation, arguing that more often such liberation movements base thier mobilisation 
on more traditional, religious, and basically nationalist positions.2 Such a strategy was in  
many ways not so much an option, as a necessity in a colonial situation. Basil Davidson, in 
an analysis of the Cabral Legacy, has rightly explained that one of the many strengths of 
Cabral was that he had seen that:
African use of nationalism, as a weapon to get decolonisation was not an 
optional alternative to the use of some other weapon. There was no other 
weapon, or none that could have the least prospect of becoming 
effective... There was no other way ahead,, after 1945, than the road 
opened to and by nationalism; and the petty-bourgeoisie, however, 
blinkered in the majority, was the stratum that must lead along it.3 4
To be sure, Cabral also understood the need to move beyond nationalism, but not without 
fully understanding its full importance and impact not only at a political level, but also in 
the cultural arena. Liberation movements, on the whole, have grown on this nationalist 
terrain, and do not move decidedly beyond its parameters in the post-colonial period. The 
Marxist discourse that characterises a certain level of rhetoric in liberation movements 
appears to have been initiated, but not organically integrated into the organisation, 
structures and common sense of the liberation struggles.
Aquino de Braganca and Jacques Depelchin have provided a useful methodological 
essay on the uneven experience of Frelimo’s liberation struggle, noting the relationship 
between political preparation and military advance, and the effect in turn of rapid military 
advance on political organisation and mobilisation. Thus they note that while the military 
advances of Frelimo into Tete in 1972 were made possible by the political and ideological 
solidity of the liberated areas in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, this military progress 
did not automatically imply an extension or reproduction of the liberated zones. This 
analysis leads De Braganca and Depelchin to question the methodology of analysing 
liberation movements. Thus they write:
Generally speaking, in the chronic ting of victorious historiographies, it is 
rare to run into accounts which focus on ’less victorious’ aspects. Thus in 
the history of the armed struggle, since the process led to . victory, it is 
considered unnecessary to analyse, in critical manner, the content and 
limits of that victory: aspects of the victory which, in'the future, could
2 Introduction to I. Mandaza (Ed) -  Zimbabwe: The Political Economy o f Transition -  C O.D.E.S.R.I.A., 1986.
3 B. Davidson -  On Revolutionary Nationalism: The Legacy o f Cabral -  Race and Class, Winter, 1986, Vol. XXVII, No
3,p.42 .
4 A. De Braganca and J. Depelchin-From  the Idealistion o f Frelimo to the Understanding o f the Recent History o f 
Mozambique -  A.J.O.P.F. No. 1,1986, p.169.
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undermine or even threaten the consolidation of achieved gains are not 
assessed.5
In addition, what, was presented as persuasive argument foror the necessity of armed 
struggle developed into an implicit acceptance of the armed struggle as the only means of 
struggle.
Again, according to Depelchin,6 from research so far undertaken on workers in 
Mozambique, the main task of Frelimo members among labourers, such as the railway 
workers, was to recruit people to be sent to the struggle in the rural areas. This in turn led 
to a seeming lack of a network of organisers to work among the workers, and to develop 
another form aimed at politicising workers. In sum, in looking at the gains, contradictions 
and defeats of liberation struggles, it is necessary to remember that the history of such 
struggles cannot be assessed by looking only at the organisational history of liberation 
movements; the latter have to be placed within the broader social processes that make up 
their milieu. Moreover, in examining the experience of liberation movements and their 
post-colonial records, Russell Jacoby’s comments are pertinent:
Defeat is also a fact; it registers the constellation of forces, not the quality 
of insight, theory, and even practices. These must be elicited from the 
web of events; they are not simply contiguous with the defeat itself. 
Moreover, success and defeat are not insular realities; they partake of 
each other.7
LABOUR
In the search for alternative social forces for radical change, the category of labour has 
also evoked a series of images and exerted a set of compelling theoretical pressures ^  
radical analysts. Extrapolations on consciousness and ideology have, at times, been almost 
logically correlated with a given relation in the production process. Michaela Von 
Freyhold has identified this process as follows:8 A statistical exercise is carried out to 
determine the size of the industrial or semi-industrial labour-force, followed by an exercise 
in theory to decide which other categories might also be considered as proletarianised, 
semi-proletarian, migrant or petty-bourgeois. Then an inventory is taken of the forms of 
struggle in which the ‘working class’ engages and an assessment is made of whether these 
i may or may not imply a proletarian consciousness, whether they have recently advanced to 
a trade union type of consciousness or are still stuck at this level. The concluding 
observations usually state whether some kind of proletarian consciousness is in the making, 
but that the day must still be awaited when the revolutionary potential of the working class 
will unfold itself.
In this genre of Left analyses that concentrate on a study of the labour process and, in 
which little account is taken of the broader social relations in which labour as a class is 
defined and defines itself, there is often a tendency to impute worker consciousness on an
5 Ibid. -  p.165.
6 J. Depelchin -  Mozambique: 1960-1975 -  Some Comments on the History o f the Liberated Zones, Centro de Estudos 
Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, 1985.' (Unpub. Mimeo), pp.5-6.
7 R. Jacoby -  Dialectic o f Defeat -  Contours o f Western Marxism -  Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.4
8 M. Von Freyhold -  Labour Movements of Popular Struggles in Africa -  R.O.A.P.E. No. 39,1987, p.4.
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escalating scale of progressiveness. Moreover, when the single site of analysis is the 
workplace and the labour process, it becomes difficult for the analyst to avoid economic 
determinism, namely a tendency to establish a direct correlation between the ideology and 
actions of workers and the economic structures at a given point in time. Such an analysis 
has for the most part yet to move beyond the point of production to a broader conception 
of ideology and culture, and through this a more complex less linear conception of class 
formation. This tendency is particularly apparent in the postures of the Workerists in the 
South African debate.
Moreover, because of the uneven development of capitalism and the reproduction 
process, and the urban-rural totality of a worker’s life process, an individual may move from 
peasant to proletarian, or migrant worker, and back to peasant production, in the course 
of one lifetime. This process in turn affects the complex cultural and ideological outlook 
of labour; and the forms of labour organisation, struggle and consciousness that develop. 
The point here is that the reflex Leftist appeal to the ’proletariat’ as the fundamemtal social 
force for change needs to be tempered with a more detailed and complex analysis of its 
particular forms.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Because of a greater realisation of the complexity of labour struggles, a new trend in 
terms of analysis has been to examine more broadly based social movements.9 In sum, such 
an analysis involves looking at the peasant-worker relation, and examining the relations 
between the ‘working class’ and the struggles of the ‘non-proletarian’ masses. This is a 
positive attempt to examine the greater complexity of the reproduction process, struggles, 
consciousness and ideological formation in Africa, and also to move away from 
state-centred perceptions of transformation.
This kind of analysis also serves as an important antidote to the mechanistic ways in which 
Marxism is sometimes conceptualised as a revolutionary strategy.10 Thus in a good deal of 
Left analysis there is an overly schematic conception of categories such as class, state and 
imperialism, which is derived from an insufficiently historical conception of such 
categories. Classes, for example, are set against a paradigm of the form they should be 
taking at particular historical moments, in a manner described in the section above on 
LABOUR. Taken to the extreme, such conceptions categorise the formulation of 
ideologies, outside of such class paradigms, as false consciousness.
In political/strategic terms, this conception translates itself into an inability to integrate 
Marxism into national political and cultural traditions. This is because it is assumed that 
’Marxism-Leninism’ is the apotheosis of working class ideology and that all other forms of 
national ideological struggle must be subsumed, not organically articulated, into what is 
perceived as a complete Marxist world view.
This perspective, in turn, generates a view of alliances between the proletariat, the 
peasant and sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, in which such alliances are seen as purely
9 M. Mamdani, T. Mkandawire arid Wamba-dia-Wamba -  Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Straggle 
for Democracy in Africa -  C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A. Working Paper 1/88.
10 This part of the discussion is taken from B. Raftopoulos -  The Dar-Es-Salaam Debate -  Reflections on Certain Trends 
in African Marxism -  Forthcoming ZIDS Working Paper.
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instrumental, through which the class demands of allied classes are articulated to those of 
a fundamental class (the proletariat) with each group maintaining its own ideology. Here 
alliance means, for the most part, the subordination Of the ideology and demandsOfallied 
classes, to the central paradigm of proscribed proletarian ideology, which is considered in 
abstract, as a wholly constituted working class ideology, instead of an ideological process 
that needs to be, worked out in a concrete, historical and national context.
Such perspectives thus lead to a view of political alliance without hegemony, in the 
Gramscian sense of the word; that is an alliance that is political, expressing what is 
perceived as class interest at an economic level only, without also being moral and 
intellectual.
. There are two lessons to be drawn from this analysis. Firstly, anti-imperialist alliances 
need to be conceived in more than just instrumental political terms, in which a leading class 
,or party imposes its superior world views on its allies. Lasting and effective alliances are 
not built through such Leftist paternalism. Secondly, such formalist conceptions of 
vanguardism can often lead to well-meaning, progressive petty-bourgeois intellectuals 
adopting an extremely statist conception of the transition to socialism. This is because of 
a theoretical and political indisposition to an alliance based on historically and 
organisationally developed ideological hegemony, rather than imposed'theoreticist 
‘truths’. In a salutary reminder of this problem, Hobsbawm has observed that:
The struggle for hegemony before, during and after the transition remains 
crucial in all circumstances.. Power alone, even revolutionary power, 
cannot replace it.11
Such an appropriation of statism is easily carried out in Third World formations, where 
the nature of capitalist penetration has often produced weak forms of civil society.
' THE STATE '
This brings us to the problem of the state. The Left in Africa have grown increasingly 
critical of the role of the state, even the ‘progressive state’ in the transformation process. 
Shivji, for example, has criticised what he characterises as the ‘developmentalist’ ideology 
of most post-colonial African states.12 Under the guise of this ‘developmentalist’ rhetoric, 
issues of democracy and participation are subordinated in the interests of ’national’ 
economic development. For the working people, the terrain of politics is continuously 
repressed in the interests of a quest for increased production. This de-politicisation is, of 
course, itself a feature of state politics, as the latter seeks to maintain a monopoly over the 
definition of the political. The expression of such politics is either the repression of or 
attempted state incorporation of popular organisations. In another intervention, Shivji13 
criticised the left for what he termed their ‘entrist’ position on the post-colonial state and 
party. That is, he has . criticised the Left for, believing that they can enter either the 
post-colonial state or party and attempt to change these organs from within. According to
11 E. J. Hobsbawm -  Gramsci and Marxist Political Theory -  In A. Showstack Sassoon (Ed) -  Approaches to Gramsci 
Writers and Readers, 1982.
Introduction - 1. Shivji (Ed) -  The State and the Working People in Tanzania -  C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A., 1985.
I. Shivji -  The Politics o f the Left in Africa: Towards a Self-Criticism- Public T alk at A.A.P.S. (Zimbabwe Chapter) 
on 21st January, 1988 -  (Unpub. Mimeo).
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Shivji, this strategy is based on an unscientific understanding of the class nature of such 
post-colonial institutions, and the end result is that the Left itself is captured by such 
institutions. He, therefore, advises the Left to work for the creation of autonomous 
organisations for working people in civil society.
Shivji has produced an important critique Of the post-colonial state and the Left’s 
approach towards i t  However, there are several points which need to be raised with regard 
to his analysis. Firstly, his analysis of post-colonial state ideological domination needs to 
be refined to portray the greater complexity of the picture.
For it could be argued that this ‘developmentalist’ ideology was articulated as much, and 
at times more, for a foreign audience of international financiers than for internal 
consumption. This is because of the large degree of marginalisation of most working 
people from the sphere of civil society, and the terrain of such articulated discourse. 
Post-colonial states maintain their control, not only through coercion and its concomitant 
lack of hegemony, but also because the dependent and inefficient nature of the 
post-colonial state allows people to reproduce themselves in the interstices of such 
inefficiency and dependency, despite as well as because of the activities and limitations of 
the state. This process should be distinguished from any conception of an ‘uncaptured 
peasantry’ that posits a pristine pre-capitalist presence. What this process provides is not 
a blanket assent to state policies or the dictates of capital. Instead what emerges is either 
the anomie and anonymity of the city and the apathy of certain aspects of rural social 
relations, or an opposition in which the everyday ‘practical consciousness’ of working 
people interprets events and their consequences through differing and contradictory 
ideological frameworks. Finally, it should be remembered that the hegemony of a 
dominating class is "not only the articulate upper level of ‘ideology’ nor are its forms of 
control only those ordinarily seen as ‘manipulation’ and ‘indoctrination’." A 
petty-bourgeois governing class in a post-colonial state can, within the limitations of 
post-colonial economies, generates certain levels of consent, through its social/economic 
programmes, the historical memory of a recent liberation struggle, the continuing 
resonance of nationalism and anti-racism, or the more particularistic ’consent’ of ethnic 
complicity.
As to Shivji’s critique of the ’entrist’ strategy of the Left with regard to the state and party, 
it is dear that he is, in important respects, correct in his criticisms.
Recently, within the Zimbabwean context, Davies has repeated this criticism of the Left 
as being naive and voluntarist in their attitude towards the state.14 5 Some qualifying 
remarks, however, need to be made about these criticisms. At best they represent an 
important reminder of the structural imperatives underlying the activities of the state. At 
worst, they underestimate the contradictions within the state and present the latter as 
something of a monolith. In addition, while this critique points to the importance of the 
development of autonomous, non-state organisations of working people, the analysis fails 
to delineate the type of relationships that such movements should establish with the state. 
This can in turn lead to both an underestimation of state power and the role of sections of
14 R. Williams-Marxism and Literature-QXfJP. 1977, p.110.
15 R. Davies -  Economic Policy, the State and the Left in Africa -  Paper given at the Zimbabwe Economics Society 
Conference on Southern Africa: Economic Experiences Since Independence, Lessons for South Africa and Namibia, 
Harare, 16-18 November, 1988.
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the petty-bourgeoisie, as well as an idealisation of these autonornous organisations of 
working people. The critique of the statist position can result in a spurious kind oif Left 
fbrmalisin.
IMPERIALISM
Let me now turn to imperialism. As an historical legacy and a continuing system of 
international linkages, imperialism has generated real constraints and limitations on 
development in Africa. This is almost a truism, but one that needs to be repeated in the 
light of criticisms from sections of the EuropeanLeft, like Gavin Kitching.1- The latter has 
criticised the African Left for portraying imperialism as being endowed "with apparently 
all conquering power, total clarity and unanimity of purpose, and almost omnipotent causal 
potency", thus leading to a kind of fatalism on the part of; the African Left. Kitching, 
because of his abhorrence of dependency theory, has equated the theory of imperialism 
with a political fatalism. It is one thing to say that in the hands of certain analysts the ’will’ 
of imperialism appears to unfold with an ineluctable logic; it is quite another to use this 
premise to dismiss the very real constraints, and pressures, imposed by imperialism. 
Kitching’s ’answer’ to the problem of radical transformation is then revealed in his view 
that socialism in Africa must await the development of a working class in the context of a 
developing capitalism.
This essentially Warrenite position can best be viewed as an escape into modernity, thus 
eschewing the immediate problem of dealing with the real social forces at work in Africa 
today.
Most African radicals know the very real constraints that imperialism imposes on the 
social formations of their countries. They have to live and deal with those constraints on 
a daily basis. On a more theoretical level, as Nicos Mouzelis has pointed out, concepts such 
as dependency and dependent development make sense only within, an "historically 
oriented macro-comparative approach, focusing on the major differences as well as 
interconnections between the capitalist trajectories of the centre and the periphery".
CONCLUSION
The major aim of this article has been to attempt to confront some of the thorny 
theoretical and political issues facing the African Left today and, 1 believe, for the 
foreseeable future. It has attempted to go beyond some of the displaced, however well- 
intentioned mythologies of sections of the Left. This is not out of a sense of disillusion with 
the possibility of working people transforming their societies (though one can already 
envisage the apopletic denunciations from the ’purists’) but out of the conviction that if the 
"resources for such a journey of hope" are to be built up, then the beginning must be an 
analysis of what those resources really are, and not what a teleologically informed vision 
supposes them to be. - ' ■
16 G. Kitching -  Politics, Method and Evidence in the ‘Kenya Debate’ in H. Bernstein and B. Campbell (Eds) -  
Contradictions o f Accumulation in Africa -  Studies in Economy and State, Sage Publications, 1985, pp.115-152.




We live on a continent on which those who labour are facing the prospect of an increasing 
cycle of disaster and decline. The very processes of reproduction are being destroyed and 
displaced, as the contours of the human and ecological landscape recede, with a compelling 
intensity, into further stages of desperation. Of course, the dramatised world of the 
imperialist centres already has a convention for portraying such processes, a mode of 
presenting, packaging and ‘dealing with’ African disaster. At its most insane, this 
convention postures in the austere, technically appropriate gard of Structural Adjustment, 
already a synonym for Western cynicism towards African poverty.
The grimace on this mask is at one end of a continuum that proceeds into the more 
presentable face of aid, with its avuncular demeanour. Even when dissenting youth call 
out for Band Aid, the logic of that dissent is that it is rapidly assimilated into the broader 
pressures of the world economy. Thus the conventions for responding to Africa have been 
set, and packaged for media appearances in the West, distanced, distorted, pathetic, and 
almost always misunderstood.
In the face of such conditions, it is tempting to reach for slogans, acts of faith, 
restatements of orthodoxies. It is less attractive to confront a set of radical tenets without 
the foreclosure of absolute success, a ‘Marxism without guarantees’. With glasnost, 
perestroika and the self-critique of existing socialism, socialists are much clearer on what 
they do not want, than on the contours of a future socialism.
/
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